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Abstract In this reply I defend Kripke’s creationist thesis for mythical objects (Refer-
ence and Existence, 2013) against Jeffrey Goodman’s counter-argument to the thesis
(BCreatures of fiction, objects of myth^, Analysis, 74(1), 35–40, 2014). I argue that
Goodman has mistaken the basis for when mythical abstracta are created. Contrary to
Goodman I show that, as well as how, Kripke’s theory consistently retains the analogy
between creation of mythical objects and creation of fictional objects, while also
explaining in what way they differ.
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In a recent paper, Jeffrey Goodman presents a simple but seemingly efficient argument
against a few philosophers’ theses on the creation of mythical objects (2014).1 One of




1All references to Goodman are given henceforth with pagination only.
2 Goodman refers to Kripke (1973), the unpublished (transcript) of Kripke’s lecture Reference and Existence.
In 2013 it was published and Kripke notes in the intro that he Bdid not intend to apply the notion [i.e. that the
existence of fictional and mythical characters depends on the existence and non-existence of various fictional
or mythological works], to ‘Vulcan’, ‘phlogiston’, or other vacuous theoretical names of a more recent vintage,
which are ‘mythological’ objects only in a highly extended and perhaps even metaphorical sense of
‘mythological’ (Kripke 2013:x, the parenthesis is added by me as a paraphrase from Kripke, cf. Goodman
2013:37, fn. 7). I will avoid holding this clarification of Kripke’s against Goodman, partly because the
clarification is an obvious addition to the original lecture, but mainly since Kripke continues to say that he is
Bnot entirely sure of the difference in principle [- - -] So perhaps I should have extended the treatment to them




1 Department of Philosophy and History, Division of Philosophy, KTH Royal Institute of
Technology, Brinellvägen 32, 100 44 Stockholm, Sweden
I will explain the relevant details of Kripke’s specific creationism as this reply
evolves, however – in general – a creationist is someone who believes in the existence
of contingently created abstracta, e.g., a fictional creationist believes in the existence of
the fictional abstracta such as Sherlock Holmes, while a mythical creationist believes in
the existence of mythical abstracta such as unicorns (cf. p. 35).
Goodman’s basic argument rests on two theses:
(2) There is a possible world where Le Verrier performs relevantly similar activities
to those he actually performed and yet fails to create Vulcan (p. 37).
Goodman thinks that in some possible world, X, Le Verrier performs relevantly
similar activities – as he did in the actual world – but in X BLe Verrier’s scientific
hypothesis regarding an intra-Mercurial planet is true^ (p. 38). Therefore, in X, (the
actions of) Le Verrier would not have created a mythical planet, and thus (according to
premise 1) the creation thesis must be false. As a comparison, if there is a flesh-and-
blood person that matches with the description of Sherlock Holmes in the story, then
this would not affect the creation of the abstracta Holmes (p. 37f).
I agree that in the former counter-factual situation the abstractum Vulcan is not
created, but I deny that a creationist must accept premise 1. Premise 1 rests on the
supposition that creation of myth is dependent only on authorial activities, not on facts
about the mind-independent world (i.e. the world that is external to the author), which
is just not true on Kripke’s theory. Firstly, on Kripke’s theory the creation of myth
depends on the author (in Goodman’s words) being mistaken – a property which is
normally dependent on the mind-independent world. When a five year old kid thinks
that there is a ghost living under her bed and names it ‘Ghosty’ it is her mistake – and
the mistaken usage of an empty name (‘Ghosty’) – that is the essential aspects of
creation. Since mistake is the necessary qualifier it follows that premise 1 contains a
non-sequitur since the creation of mythical abstracta in other possible worlds does not
depend on the author performing relevantly similar activities to those she actually
performed. 3 Secondly, but related to the previous point, premise 1 is misleading
3 There is a slight complication. The simple case is this: in a possible world such that the five year old kid
(presuming rigidity) performs the relevantly similar activities, and is not mistaken, she would not create a
mythical abstractum called ‘Ghosty’, but rather she would name something ‘Ghosty’. What is slightly more
complicated is that this something is not, according to Kripke, identical to what we would call Ghosty in our
world (which is also why I use the word ‘something’ rather than ‘ghost’ for ghosts does not exist in any
possible world, given that we are right in supposing that ghosts are actually only mythical abstracta and not a
natural kind). Kripke gives a few arguments for this; the most important perhaps being that there is no way to
qualify if a mythical abstractum is identical to some real thing. Even if we have descriptions of ghosts, or of
Ghosty, any match with such description may be purely accidental – there is no way to know. It is for science
to find out what actually qualifies as a natural kind, so just because something matches with the description of
a mistake does not mean that it is identical with that mythical abstractum (given that it actually is a mythical
abstractum) (cf. Kripke 2013: 41–53). Now, one may think that Vulcan would be a case contrary to this
example. However, Le Verrier could have been right – in his existential claim – while being wrong about
various descriptive qualities, so any likeness between Vulcan and objects named ‘Vulcan’ in worlds were Le
Verrier performs similar activities as in our world and is right is thus purely accidental and insufficient for
identity.
(1) If Vulcan is a created abstractum (like Holmes), then Vulcan is created by Le
Verrier in every possible world where Le Verrier performs relevantly similar
activities to those he actually performed.
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because it makes it seem as if myth is necessarily created by authors – in the standard
sense of an author – not by mistake. However, unlike fictional abstracta mythical
abstracta are not necessarily created by an author and it is not necessary to identify any
authorial intensions. Thus, while it is sensible to think of Le Verrier as an author, his
authorial activities are not necessary for the actual creation of the myth. In fact, we need
not even have an author involved in authorial activities for the actual criterion (which is
something Goodman’s example and his text betrays). For example, Kripke considers
cases in which the hearer (of a story) – or even the author (because she forgets) –
mistakes a work of fiction for non-pretense (cf. Kripke 2013:30). In such cases – as in
the case of Vulcan – the creation of the mythical abstractum is due to the mistake, not
the authorial activities. In the previous example of the confused author the authorial
activities are that of pretense and thus create fiction; the author does not create the myth
because of any authorial activities (or as an author), rather the myth is created despite
her authorial activities.4 Actual examples of this may include well-made mockumen-
taries, such as Peter Jackson’s Forgotten Silver (1996, New Zealand) in which Jackson
is pretending to make a documentary in which he has rediscovered the filmmaker Colin
McKenzie who was (according to the story) actually the first filmmaker to do tracking
shots and close-ups. Unlike stories with the introductory BOnce upon a time^ Jackson is
hiding his pretense, presenting it as a documentary. As such it is reasonable to think that
some were tricked by Jackson, mistaking pretense for the real thing.5 If that is true, then
a myth is created, but it is far-fetched to think of the people making these mistakes as
being authors in the sense of Le Verrier. This implies that the creation of myth does not
necessarily have anything to do with authorial activities at all, but is connected only to
mistakes (cf. fn. 4, below). Thus, we should conclude that the specific example used by
Goodman betrays the general nature of the creation of myth, which is dependent on
mistake rather than authorial activities.
However, one may think that even though authorial activities are not necessary for
creation, there may be special cases for which it is – such as for Vulcan. However, the
buck does not stop here, because Goodman’s example and his text, is also misleading
about his actual example, since not even the creation of the mythical object Vulcan is
necessarily connected to Le Verrier authorial activities (cf. fn. 4, below). Consider the
fact that in some possible world (albeit perhaps not amongst the closest ones) Le Verrier
is writing the same theories as he actually did write, with the intensional difference that
he merely pretends to be doing science or theorizing. In such a world, there exists a
fictional entity which the name ‘Vulcan’ (in that world) refers to.6 However, imagine
further that various people believe that Le Verrier is actually performing science and
theorizing, just like people may have believed in Forgotten Silver (which is likely,
4 This should not be confused with the role that the authorial activities play in providing material for a mistake.
However, as the thought example by Kripke shows, the actual mistake (i.e. the creational aspect) does not
depend on the authorial activities as such, since it is, arguably, independent of the author’s authorial intension
(which were that of pretense).
5 I say that is it reasonable since I want to avoid claiming it was actually the case, since there are myths about
people believing in fiction. For example, people have mistakenly believed that Orson Welles fictional
radioshow War of the Worlds was mistaken for the real thing (Chilton 2016).
6 This is not a refusal of rigidity, since it is important not to confuse the fact that in some possible world a
combination the combination of symbols that make up the name ‘Saul Kripke’ does not necessarily refer to
Saul Kripke in that world, since different languages and possible worlds have different symbol conventions.
This is not to say that ‘Saul Kripke’ does not refer to Saul Kripke in every possible world.
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presuming that this world is otherwise quite similar to ours). If so a mythical object
named ‘Vulcan’ would be created, which arguably would be the same mythical object
as in our world (however, in this possible world the name ‘Vulcan’ would be ambig-
uous). In such a case the creators (in the sense of being the cause of the creation) of the
myth are the ones mistaking Le Verriers writing for being non-pretense, rather than Le
Verrier himself. Clearly such a mistake is not authorial. What this example
shows is that the creation of the mythical object Vulcan does not necessarily
have anything to do with Le Verrier’s authorial activities at all, but rather with
the mistake. A mistake which in the actual world happened to be his and part
of his authorial activities, but in another possible world – in which his authorial
intensions were otherwise – the mistake was not his. It needs to be noted that
this example is not in direct conflict with premise 1, since Le Verrier’s
authorial activities in the possible world in which he writes pretense are
different from ours. Instead it is in conflict with premise 1 indirectly, since it
shows that premise 1 is irrelevant, i.e. that Goodman’s argument is not a
counter-example against Kripke’s creational theory, since creation of mythical
abstracta are not related to authorial activities in the sense presumed.7 However,
we could also imagine Le Verrier doing science, but not believing in his
findings (for some reason). In such a situation Le Verrier would, arguably, be
performing similar activities as he did, without creating the abstractum Vulcan
– which would directly conflict with premise 1.
I will get back to the details of this in just a moment, for while Goodman
does not re-count the specificity of Kripke’s theory (nor these more complex
considerations) he does recognize the more general idea that premise 1 hangs
on the thesis that created abstracta are created solely in virtue of the Bauthor’s
intentions and social/historical context^ (p. 39).8 Goodman considers the idea
that the creation of a mythical object also depends on the mind-independent
world, such that if no relevant entity is provided the creation occurs, otherwise
not (ibid). He responds:
This reply, however, forces a very unhappy decision on the mythical creationist.
On the one hand, suppose she maintains that the analogy between the creative
process for both fictional characters and mythical objects is extremely tight. If she
then further claims that it is the very absence of an intra-Mercurial planet that is
facilitating the creation of Vulcan in our world, then she should amend her
fictional creationism by claiming that it is the very absence of a flesh and blood,
supremely clever crime solver called Holmes who is fond of cocaine and pipe-
smoking, etc. that is facilitating the creation of Holmes in our world. But no
7 Again, it should be noted (cf. fn. 4) that authorial activities often play a role in the creation of myths in so far
as the authorial activities supply content of which we can be mistaken. But this is not the creational aspect. For
example, Jackson’s authorial activities – i.e. that of making pretense (even though it, likely, was meant to be
misleading) – were of course not what created the myth (if people actually mistook Forgotten Silver for a real
documentary).
8 Goodman also quotes David Braun, in a footnote. In the quote Braun identifies mistakes as a necessary
property for the creation of myths saying that Bif story-tellers’ activities create fictional characters, then
mistaken theorizers’ activities create abstract objects of a similar sort^ (p. 36, fn. 5, Braun 2005: 615, emphasis
added).
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fictional creationist should say that. The world providing such an entity matters
not at all as to whether Doyle’s activities succeed in creating Holmes (ibid).
There are several problems with Goodman’s reply. Firstly, the main gust of his
argument is the idea that denying premise 1 solely for myth (but not for fiction) would
imply a disanalogy between the creation of fictional entities9 and creation of mythical
entities that would be unsatisfactory for the creationist. However, it is not clear why this
would be the case. In fact, Goodman seems to be mistaken about the precise nature of
how the creation of myth is analogous to the creation of fiction (according to the
theories of Kripke). As previously noted Goodman has connected the creation of myth
to authorial activities, in fact he seems to mistakenly believe that such a relation is
necessary, thinking that mythical creationism is an expansion of fictional creationalism,
in which the latter is Bdependent on […] authorial activities^ and the former – i.e.
mythical abstracta Bare likewise abstracta of our production^ (p. 35). He furthermore
establishes this link by nothing that Bit is natural to think that Holmes came about
because Doyle thought him up, and Vulcan came about because Le Verrier thought it
up^ (p. 36). But as my previous examples show it is not clear that this is the best way to
interpret Kripke’s theory. As I have argued the fact that the mythical abstractum Vulcan
came about because Le Verrier thought it up is only accidental (had his scientific
writing been pretense, and mistaken for scientific writing, someone else would have
been the creator of Vulcan). And this mistake – on Goodman’s part – is, arguably, what
makes the argument of this so-called disanalogy seem sensible. However, it is rooted in
a misconception of the difference between creation of myth and the creation of fiction
and what necessarily differentiates one from the other, for they are not analogous in the
authorial sense.
Secondly, the actual analogy between myth and fiction certainly is not perfectly
similar, simply because myth and fiction are not the same. But just as myth is different
from fiction, the creation of such abstracta differs. Thus, the analogy holds only in
relation to these differences (as it should). As previously noted what Kripke claims is
that mythical objects – such as Vulcan – are created in virtue of some mistake(s), and
fictional objects are created in virtue of some pretense. Therefore, in accordance with
these differences the analogy holds perfectly:
& A mythical object is created (partly) because of a mistake.
& A fictional object is created (partly) because of a pretense.
Given Kripke’s theory it is clear that when Goodman previously described a
counter-factual situation in which Le Verrier was not mistaken, it is correct to say that
in such a situation a mythical object was not created. However, Goodman seems to
think that under such a theory the analogous situation is one in which there is a flesh-
and-blood person matches the description of Doyle’s stories. This is not the case, for in
such a situation it does not follow that Doyle is not pretending. Whether Doyle
pretended is logically independent of whether a flesh-and-blood character exists.10 In
9 In this article I am using ‘entity’ and ‘object’ interchangeably.
10 Even if the existence of something which matches his descriptions would make it more likely that he did not
make-up Sherlock Holmes.
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fact, the example considered by Goodman is quite similar to Kripke’s criticism of
descriptivism about naming, since for a descriptivist if there is an object that matches
properly with the story then Sherlock Holmes exists (cf. Kripke 2013:26f). 11 The
analogous situation would instead be one in which Doyle is not pretending. Such a
counter-factual situation, in which Sherlock Holmes is not created, was also previously
presented by Kripke. He considers the possibility that he was wrong about Sherlock
Holmes, i.e. that Doyle did not write stories but, e.g., newspaper articles: BIf so, I am
wrong, and I am under a mistaken impression that there are no such genuine proposi-
tions such as that Sherlock Holmes lived on Baker Street […] It may turn out for all that
I know that I have made such a mistake^ (Kripke 2013:42).
That is, under such a counter-factual situation, the fictional character Sherlock
Holmes is not created and in such a possible world the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ does
not refer to the same object (nor the same kind of object) as the name ‘Sherlock
Holmes’ does is in the actual world (given that we are correct in presuming that
Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character, in the actual world).12
Returning to the question of the analogy between myth and fiction Kripke claims –
as the title of this article indicates – that Bmost of what I say about pretense, though not
perhaps all (you can check it out for yourselves), will apply mutatis mutandis with the
term ‘mistake’ in place of ‘pretense’^ (Kripke 2013: 31). This is the standard analogy
between fiction and myth. Part of the problem with Goodman’s argument is that he
presumes that the analogy must be stronger, so that premise 1 generally applies to both,
but it is not clear if this presumption is compatible with a meaningful difference
between myth and pretense, since for Goodman’s argument to work it would need to
be presented against a theory in which mistake is replaced by another predicate that has
similar authorial properties as pretense. It is questionable if such a creational theory
would really even be about myths. Thus, it is questionable if any creational theory (at
least any theory which adheres to the theory of direct references about proper names) is
affected by Goodman’s argument; however, clearly Kripke’s theory is not.
11 This is perhaps not so surprising, since Goodman acknowledges that he Bowe a huge debt to Phillips (2001)
[…] [who] aims to show that the direct reference theorist may not plausibly identify the referent of ‘Vulcan’
with a created abstractum –much of what [Phillips] says inspired the argument I present here against mythical
creationism^ (p. 37, fn. 6).
According to Kripke, however, given that Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character Bhe^ (in this article I
ignore the fact that many philosopher’s – amongst which Kripke is probably one of them – would say that it is
wrong to say he or she of a fictional character outside the story) could or would not he have been a flesh and
blood person (cf. Kripke 2013:40ff). It should be noted that the implication above does not presume that
Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character, neither does Kripke. Instead, whenever Kripke discusses cases of
myth and fiction he keeps putting in caveats such as Bremember here that we are supposing that there are no
unicorns^ (Kripke 2013:44) or BGiven that this is so^ (Kripke 2013:46), and it is given such presumptions that
he discusses what could or would have been the case – and in virtue of such suppositions being true he can
speak specifically about examples such as Sherlock Holmes. As such he would agree with Goodman that no
flesh-and-blood entity can ever be identical with Sherlock Holmes (given that Sherlock Holmes is a fictional
character), but the more general principle at work here is that no fictional character could or would [possibly]
be a real flesh-and-blood person.
12 I would argue that – if we are true Kripkeans – what we should say about the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ in
that possible world and ‘Sherlock Holmes’ in the actual world, is that they are not the same names, since any
name necessarily refers to the same objects in all possible worlds. Their similarity is merely a matter of
symbolic identity; just as words in different languages can be constructed out of identical symbols while
differing in meaning.
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To make it even more apparent that – contrary to Goodman – the analogy
between myth and fiction still holds, consider Kripke’s previous example of the
counter-factual situation in which Sherlock Holmes (the fictional character) does
not exist: i.e. a possible world in which Doyle is not writing fiction, but a
newspaper article about a flesh-and-blood detective named ‘Sherlock Holmes’.
However, further imagine that no such flesh-and-blood detective exists. In this
possible world, Doyle is not pretending, but he is mistaken. Therefore, in such
a possible world a mythical abstractum named ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is created.
Thus, that the analogy holds does not mean that the situations of creation of
fictional abstracta and mythical abstracta do not differ; they do. We can
generalize the above examples to further illustrate how the theory hangs
together. Imagine a text that includes the name ‘O’, which the text refers to
as a physical object. If the text is pretense then ‘O’ (outside the text13) refers to
a created abstractum in the form of a fictional object, if the text is neither
pretense, nor mistake, then ‘O’ (outside, and inside, the text) refers to a
physical object, and if the text is a mistake then ‘O’ (outside the text) refers
to a created abstractum in the form of a mythical object.
This means that under normal circumstances the creation of myth is partly dependent
on the mind-independent world, since whether we are mistaken about the non-mythical
existence of Vulcan, unicorns, or Ghosty, is a questions dependent on what exists in the
mind-independent world, and it is partly in virtue of the non-existence of such a non-
mythical entity that the mythical objects come to exist. Fictional objects, on the other
hand, do not – under normal circumstances – depend on the mind-independent world
(at least not in the same sense), but on the question of whether the author actually
pretended or not.
Thus, the relevant similarity is not that the process of mistake and the process of
pretense are identical, but that both processes create an abstractum due to, e.g., the use
of an empty name, and does so in a manner that is analogous in relation to itsdifferences
(i.e. if the use of that empty name is due to a mistake, or pretense).14
As should be evident, Goodman has not compared a situation of non-
pretense with a situation of non-mistake, but a situation of pretense with a
situation of non-mistake. The seemingly disanalogous result that follow from
Goodman’s comparing different forms of creationism is simply due to the use
of disanalogous examples, and it does not affect Kripke’s theory in the least (in
fact, the fictional example can be used in favor of Kripke’s account, by
showing the downfall of descriptivism as applied to names in fiction).
The conclusion here is that premise 1 does not generally hold for creation of
abstracta, since it standardly fails for myth. However, it is worth mentioning that there
13 I have omitted the complications of what a name refers to within-the-story vs. outside-the-story (speaking
only of the latter, since we have been speaking of abstractums which lies outside any text). Kripke’s theory is
as follows: ‘Sherlock Holmes’ refers, in the actual world, to a fictional object (or character), while within-the-
story ‘Sherlock Holmes’ refers to a flesh-and-blood person (a very clever detective) (see, e.g., Kripke 2013:
BLecture III^).
14 I am not saying that the creation of abstractums necessarily depends on naming, it may be the case that
various abstractums may be created, e.g., as in the case of fiction when objects are implicitly spoken of within
the pretense, without being named. Nothing hangs on this issues, it is only for the sake of simplifying the
argumentation in this reply that I am using names.
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are plausibly some special cases in which premise 1 holds for myth, but in such cases
premise 2 fails, so the argument does not go through anyway.15
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